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1Executive Summary
 This report examines the activities of an independent office within the Small Business 
Administration: the Office of Advocacy.  The Office of Advocacy has responsibility for ensuring 
that federal agencies evaluate the small business impacts of the rules they adopt.  Scientific 
assessments are not “rules” and do not regulate small business, yet the Office of Advocacy decided 
to comment on technical, scientific assessments of the cancer risks of formaldehyde, styrene, and 
chromium.  By its own admission, Advocacy lacks the scientific expertise to evaluate the merits of 
such assessments.
The report analyzes correspondence and materials received through a Freedom of 
Information Act request made by staff at the Center for Effective Government.  Our inquiry 
was driven by two questions:  Why did the Office of Advocacy get involved in the debate over 
scientific assessments that do not regulate small business?  Whose interests does the Office of 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration actually serve?
We found that the Office of Advocacy’s comments on these assessments raised no issues 
of specific concern to small business and relied almost exclusively on talking points provided by 
trade associations dominated by big chemical companies.  Between 2005 and 2012, the American 
Chemistry Council (ACC) and its members spent over $333 million lobbying Congress and 
federal agencies on, among other things, a protracted campaign to prevent government agencies 
from designating formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium as carcinogens.  The Formaldehyde 
Council, Styrene Industry Research Council, and Chrome Coalition spent millions more.  These 
groups asked the Office of Advocacy for assistance, and the Office became their willing partner.
We conclude that the Office of Advocacy’s decision to comment on scientific assessments 
of the cancer risks of certain chemicals constitutes a significant and unwarranted expansion of 
its role and reach beyond its statutory responsibilities.  We recommend that Congress ask the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate the Office of Advocacy and exert more 
rigorous oversight of its activities to ensure its work does not undermine the efforts of other 
federal agencies to fulfill the goals Congress has assigned them.
Key Findings:
	The Office of Advocacy hosts regular Environmental Roundtables attended by trade 
association representatives and lobbyists.  The discussions and minutes are kept secret, 
although the consensus positions that emerge appear to inform the Office of Advocacy’s 
policy positions.  These meetings violate the spirit, and perhaps the letter, of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act.
2	The Office of Advocacy staff made no effort to educate themselves on the science underlying 
the debates about the cancer risks of formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium or to verify the 
accuracy of the talking points provided to them by industry lobbyists before filing comments 
critical of the scientific conclusions in each assessment.  Instead, the Office of Advocacy 
simply repackaged and submitted talking points provided by trade association lobbyists as 
formal comments. 
	Correspondence between the Office of Advocacy and trade associations dominated by large 
chemical companies and their lobbyists suggests the Office became entangled in a major 
lobbying campaign to prevent the federal government from listing certain chemicals as known 
or probable carcinogens.  E-mails suggest the Office of Advocacy may have violated the Anti-
Lobbying Act and other lobbying restrictions.  
	No small businesses objected to the scientific assessments or asked the Office of Advocacy 
to intervene in the cancer assessments.  The Office of Advocacy made no effort to determine 
whether the positions it took represented small business views and interests.  Moreover, since 
small businesses may produce substitutes for toxic chemicals, a cancer finding for existing 
chemicals could open up new markets for substitute chemicals produced by small businesses.  
	No process or procedures seem to be in place to ensure that the activities of the Office of 
Advocacy are consistent with, and do not work to undermine, the statutory responsibilities of 
other agencies. 
Recommendations:
	The Office of Advocacy should limit its work to regulatory activities affecting small business, 
as authorized by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and subsequent laws.
	Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the Office of Advocacy’s Environmental 
Roundtables violate Federal Advisory Committee Act provisions.
	The Office of Advocacy should independently verify the factual claims it makes in comments 
to other federal agencies and should not comment on technical or scientific matters on which 
its staff have no expertise.  
	Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the activities of the Office of Advocacy 
represent impermissible lobbying by federal employees. 
	The Office of Advocacy should develop procedures to verify that its policies represent the 
interests of small business.  Its comments should be limited to offering a small business 
perspective that the regulating agency would not otherwise hear. 
3	Congress should exert more rigorous oversight over the Office of Advocacy to ensure its work 
does not delay or prevent other federal agencies from fulfilling their statutory goals, especially 
those scientific and regulatory agencies tasked with protecting the health of the American 
people.
4Introduction
 Americans have long 
championed small businesses.  
According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, about 5,821,277 businesses 
with fewer than 100 employees 
are operating in the U.S. today, 
employing about 35 percent of the 
workforce.1  The federal government 
has been actively supporting small 
businesses since 1953, when the 
Small Business Administration was 
established to provide them with 
subsidized loans and assistance.  
Over the years, survey after survey has shown that a majority of Americans – across the political 
spectrum – believes that government should continue to provide assistance and support to small 
businesses.2  
 Surveys also show broad support for federal efforts to protect public health.3  The public 
expects the government to keep tainted food and medicines off store shelves.  They want cancer-
causing chemicals regulated, air pollution controlled, and the safety of our water supplies ensured. 
In fact, most Americans believe that existing regulations need to be better enforced.4  There is no 
reason that these two popular functions of government should conflict.  
Yet our investigation, based on correspondence and materials provided through Freedom 
of Information Act requests, has unearthed activities by a little-known independent office within 
the Small Business Administration – the Office of Advocacy – that is working to undermine 
efforts by federal scientists to identify public health hazards and ensure that American families 
are protected from cancer-causing substances.  These assessments do not regulate the activities of 
small business and seem far outside the Office’s mission – to represent the views and interests of 
small businesses to other federal agencies. 
1  See Statistics about Business Size (including Small Business), U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2013). 
2  See, e.g., Small Business Majority, Opinion Poll: Small Business Views on Taxes and the Role of Government 
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.smallbusinessmajority.org/small-business-research/taxes/taxes-and-role-of-government.php  (finding 
that “the majority of small businesses believe government can play an effective role in helping small businesses thrive”).     
3  See Coalition for Sensible Safeguards, Summary of Lake Research Partners 2011 Regulatory Research (2011), 
http://www.sensiblesafeguards.org/assets/documents/css-lrp-summary.pdf (summarizing the findings of a national poll conducted 
May 2011).  
4  Id. 
5Specifically, the Office of Advocacy sought to block the publication of scientific 
assessments of the risks of cancer developed by the National Toxicology Program and the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Integrated Risk Information System.  When cancer 
assessments are delayed or stopped, it means more Americans will be exposed to substances that 
can kill.  Delay costs lives. 
Moreover, a recent survey of a representative sample of small business owners (businesses 
with under 100 employees) suggests that the positions taken by the Office of Advocacy do not 
represent the views of the constituency on whose behalf it is supposed to advocate.5  About 60 
percent of small business owners reported that they believe “exposure to toxic chemicals in day-
to-day life” is a very serious or somewhat serious threat today; 75 percent supported “stricter 
regulation of chemicals produced and used in everyday products”; 94 percent said “companies 
using chemicals of concern to human health should disclose their presence to customers and 
the public”; and 92 percent said there should be “a public, easily accessible database identifying 
chemicals of high concern to human and environmental health.”  The survey mirrored the 
demographics of small business owners:  three quarters of the respondents were male; 82 percent 
were white; half identified as Republican and 23 percent as Independents.6 
The activities of the Office of Advocacy described in this report represent an unwarranted 
expansion of its jurisdiction, extending its reach well beyond the statutory responsibilities 
assigned to the Office under the Regulatory Flexibility Act and subsequent legislation.  The Office 
of Advocacy operates with little oversight by the Small Business Administration, the White 
House, or Congress.  Its effort to expand its jurisdiction to weigh in on toxic hazards threatens 
important health programs designed to inform the public and federal regulatory agencies about 
health risks.
5  The survey of 511 small business owners found that small business owners (SBOs) generally believe toxic chemicals pose a 
threat to people’s health, and support stricter regulation and greater disclosure of toxic chemicals. The sample was weighted by 
gender, region, ethnicity, industry type, and business size to match the characteristics of small business owners nationally. The 
margin of error for the survey is + or – 4.4%.  Poll of Small Business Owners on Toxic Chemicals, American Sustainable Business 
Council (ASBC) (Sept. 2012), http://asbcouncil.org/node/846. 
6  Id.
61. Federal Government Support for Small Businesses and the 
Office of Advocacy 
Congress established the 
Small Business Administration 
(SBA) as a separate, executive 
branch agency in 1953 to 
provide businesses “which are 
independently owned and operated 
and which are not dominant in their 
field of operation” with financial 
assistance, such as government-backed loans.7  For the next two decades, this cabinet-level agency 
responded to requests for assistance by business. 
In 1974, when Congress amended the Small Business Act, it created the office of Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy within the Small Business Administration “to represent the views and 
interests of small businesses before other Federal agencies whose policies and activities may affect” 
small businesses.8  Two years later, in 1976, the Office of Advocacy became an independent office 
within SBA, headed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy.  The Chief Counsel is appointed by the 
president and confirmed by the Senate.9  As head of an independent office, the Chief Counsel 
is not required to submit his reports and comments to the SBA Administrator or to the White 
House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review or approval.10      
Since the Office was established, its statutory authority has grown.  In 1980, Congress 
passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), which requires every federal agency to assess and 
mitigate the impact of proposed and final rules on small business consistent with its statutory 
mission and gave the Office of Advocacy the responsibility for overseeing agency compliance with 
this new mandate.11 
7  Stephen L. Keleti & Joseph A. Maranto, Planning a Full-Scale Audit of the Small Business Administration, 10 GAO Review 51 
(1975), available at http://archive.gao.gov/otherpdf1/091092.pdf.
8  Small Business Amendments Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-386, sec. 10, § 5(e)(4), 88 Stat. 742, 749 (1974), amended by Small 
Business Act and Small Business Investment Act of 1958, amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-305, tit. 2, § 201, 90 Stat. 663, 668 (1976) 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 634c(4) (2006)).
9  Small Business Act and Small Business Investment Act of 1958, amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-305, 90 Stat. 663 (1976) (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. § 634a-f (2006)).
10  15 U.S.C. § 634(f). 
11  Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011: 
Annual Report of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy on Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and 
Executive Order 13272, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 
2011], available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/11regflx_0.pdf.
7Congress again expanded its statutory responsibilities in 1996 when it enacted the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA).12  Among other provisions, this law 
required the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to convene small business review panels for every proposed rule that 
will have a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.”13  The head 
of the agency, the head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) (an office 
within OMB), and Chief Counsel for Advocacy are required to attend each panel and meet with 
representatives of “small entities” to review new rules the agency may propose and the agency’s 
analysis of the impact the rule may have on small businesses. The panel then suggests ways the 
agency can mitigate the impact on small business.  The SBREFA process delays development of 
workplace safety and environmental rules considerably.   
In 2002, President George W. Bush further expanded the Office of Advocacy’s 
responsibilities through Executive Order 13272.14  Under this executive order, all federal agencies 
were required to notify the Office of Advocacy earlier in the rulemaking process of rules 
that could potentially have a significant effect on small businesses. This was intended to give 
agencies more time to adequately consider and respond to comments submitted by the Office of 
Advocacy.15  The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 codified these new requirements.
The Office of Advocacy’s budget for FY 2012 was $9.12 million.  It has a staff of 46.  By 
comparison, OIRA, a key office in OMB responsible for reviewing the rules proposed by all 
executive agencies, had a staff of 45 in FY 2012.16 
As its budget and staff have grown, the Office of Advocacy has moved beyond 
commenting on how regulations impact small business to questioning the merits of scientific 
assessments of toxic hazards.  This substantial expansion of Advocacy’s role is well beyond its 
statutory responsibility or substantive expertise.  
12  Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) (codified in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
13  Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011, supra note 11, at 1–3.  The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 also provided that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau must 
conduct Small Business Advocacy Review (SBAR) panels when proposing economically significant rules.  Id. at 2.
14  Exec. Order No. 13272, 3 C.F.R. 247 (2003), available at http://www.foreffectivegov.org/files/regs/library/eo13272.pdf.
15  Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011, supra note 11, at 2–3.
16  Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Congressional Budget Justification FY 2013, at 6, 
available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/3-508%20Compliant%20FY%202013%20Office%20of%20Advocacy%20
CBJ%281%29.pdf.
82. Protecting the Public from Cancer-causing Chemicals: 
Scientific Assessments of Health Risks
A number of laws have been 
passed directing federal agencies 
to protect the public from health 
hazards and to reduce the cancer 
risks posed by toxic substances.  
For example, the Clean Air Act 
requires EPA to reduce particulates 
in the air based on science showing 
their presence increases the risk 
of respiratory diseases.  Congress 
directed the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission (CPSC) to ban 
lead in toys after it was shown that 
ingesting lead could cause brain and organ damage in infants.  Congress required the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) to ban the use of certain preservatives if they are shown to cause 
cancer.  
However, scientific evidence about the effects of chemicals on human health is cumulative. 
It is rare for a single study or two to provide definitive proof of increased cancer risks.  
Scientists rely on controlled experiments with animals to predict a chemical’s effect in humans.  
Epidemiological studies may indicate, but rarely prove, an association between exposure and 
harm for several reasons.  Epidemiological studies with adequate statistical power to detect small 
increases in common cancers require the collection of data and analysis of effects among large 
groups of exposed people.  They cannot be completed until enough time has passed for latent 
effects to be detected.  And, accurate data on past exposures is rarely available; reconstructed data 
may not accurately reflect past exposures.  Because of this, determining what amount of exposure 
to what chemicals causes cancer inevitably requires scientists to make informed judgments. 
Rather than asking each federal agency tasked with protecting the public’s health to 
conduct its own evaluations of the scientific evidence on carcinogens, several agencies are 
tasked with evaluating  scientific information and disseminating their conclusions to other 
federal agencies and the public.  Two of these programs are the National Toxicology Program 
in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Integrated Risk Information 
System in EPA.  Neither program sets emission standards for chemical discharges or enforces 
health or safety standards later set by other agencies.  Their role is to be an “honest broker” 
of scientific studies.  However, because labeling a substance a cancer-causing agent can have 
adverse consequences in the market and lead to stricter regulation down the road, chemical 
manufacturers watch this process carefully, challenge research findings, and develop their own 
research to promote alternative hypotheses about cancer causation.
9The National Toxicology Program Report on Carcinogens
The Public Health Service Act of 1978 directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
to prepare a Report on Carcinogens every other year that identifies substances with the potential 
to cause cancer.17  The National Toxicology Program (NTP) prepares the report to be issued on 
behalf of the Secretary of HHS, who then communicates this information to the American people 
to ensure they can make informed decisions about where they live and work. 
The report has two classifications: 54 substances are classified as known to be a human 
carcinogen; 186 substances are classified as reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen.18  A 
substance is known to be a human carcinogen if there is “sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity 
from studies in humans, which indicates a causal relationship between exposure to the agent, 
substance, or mixture, and human cancer.”19  A substance is reasonably anticipated to be a human 
carcinogen if there is some evidence of carcinogenicity from studies in humans, evidence of 
carcinogenicity from animal studies, or other evidence to suggest a substance causes cancer.  The 
Report on Carcinogens only puts substances into these broad categories; it does not quantitatively 
estimate the risk of cancer.  
Because manufacturers fear that classifying a substance as a “known carcinogen” can 
reduce its use, public officials have developed a thorough and scrupulous process for determining 
what substances should be placed on the list.  The NTP permits anyone to suggest a chemical 
should be put on the list, removed, or reclassified.  Once NTP decides to evaluate a nominated 
substance, it conducts a comprehensive review of the evidence of its carcinogenicity.  This draft 
background document is submitted to an expert panel for peer review and is put online to allow 
the public to comment.  After peer review comments are incorporated into a revised report on 
the substance, it is published again, and the public can again comment.  The final background 
document is then further reviewed by two interagency scientific review groups. Taking all 
this feedback into account, NTP prepares a draft “substance profile” and classification listing 
recommendation, which is then reviewed by its own Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC).  The 
BSC solicits comments and holds a public hearing; it then reports on whether the scientific 
information in the draft substance profile is technically correct, clearly stated, and supports the 
classification recommendation.  Only after this process has been completed is the new Report on 
Carcinogens published.20
17  Community Mental Health Centers Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-622, Sec. 262(b)(4), 92 Stat. 3412, 3434-35 (1978) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 241(b)(4) (2006)). 
18  Nat’l Toxicology Program, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, The Report on Carcinogens: Key Points; 
12th Edition (2011), available at http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/materials/report_on_carcinogens_12th_edition_the_508.pdf.
19  Report on Carcinogens: Listing Criteria, Nat’l Toxicology Program, http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/?objectid=47B37760-F1F6-975E-
7C15022B9C93B5A6 (last updated June 15, 2011).
20  In fact, the National Toxicology Program revised the procedures for completing the Report on Carcinogens several times 
since 1980 and each time, it has added opportunity for public comment and additional peer review.  
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These procedures mean that a great deal of time is required to complete a new edition of 
the Report on Carcinogens.  Large chemical companies who make the chemicals being evaluated 
and the trade associations of which they are members commented repeatedly on the 12th Report, 
which was published in 2011.  In fact, their comments dominated the debate at NTP over which 
chemicals should be listed as carcinogens.
The Environmental Protection Agency’s Integrated Risk Information System Assessments
Another major database of information about chemical toxicity is the Integrated 
Risk Information System (IRIS) at EPA, which contains information on the health effects of 
environmental contaminants.21  IRIS assessments evaluate the scientific data on chemical hazards 
and calculate acceptable exposure levels – the level below which no health effects are expected 
(known as the reference dose or reference concentration in air).  The IRIS reference dose may be 
used by other EPA programs in determining the dose of a chemical to which the public may be 
exposed.  
The IRIS database contains profiles for over 550 chemicals.  Like the NTP Report on 
Carcinogens, the assessments are the result of an extensive, multi-step review process.  A new 
IRIS assessment involves a comprehensive literature review, multiple opportunities for public 
comment, rigorous peer review of draft background documents, and final review by independent 
experts and other agency staff.  The entire process takes at least two years (and often longer).  The 
final IRIS assessment is posted online along with the summary, toxicological review, and EPA 
responses to comments received.  
NTP and IRIS provide citizens with important information about the cancer hazards 
Americans face.  Neither NTP nor IRIS assessments produce rules or regulations that govern 
business activity.  Yet the Office of Advocacy at the SBA intervened in both the NTP and the 
IRIS assessment processes.  We investigated how and why interventions related to three specific 
chemicals – formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium – occurred.
21  Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS): Basic Information, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/
iris/intro.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2012).
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The Center for Effective Government’s Investigation
 The Center for Effective Government (formerly OMB Watch) filed several Freedom of 
Information Act requests with the Office of Advocacy in the spring of 2012.  One request asked 
for documents relating to Advocacy’s comments on NTP’s 12th Report on Carcinogens and the 
risks posed by formaldehyde and styrene.  Another FOIA request asked for documents relating to 
the Office of Advocacy’s comments on EPA’s IRIS risk assessment for chromium.  Advocacy staff 
forwarded some documents responsive to our request.  After we discovered a number of missing 
documents, staff searched their files again and provided more relevant documents.  Advocacy 
claims the only documents not disclosed were intra- or interagency deliberative documents 
withheld under FOIA exemption 5.22  The Office did not provide the Center for Effective 
Government with a list of withheld documents.
 For each of the three chemical assessments investigated, the debate over the 
carcinogenicity of each substance has been going on for decades and involves complex, technical 
evaluations of toxicological and epidemiological data.  The large manufacturing companies that 
produce these chemicals have spent tens of millions of dollars disputing the scientific evidence 
showing increased cancer risks.  The Office of Advocacy admits it has no scientific expertise in 
this area, yet it chose to intervene in these proceedings.  In each of the cases we examined, we 
asked:
•	 Who asked the Office of Advocacy to intervene in these chemical assessments? 
•	 What efforts did Office of Advocacy staff make to educate themselves on the science 
underlying the debates about the health risks of these chemicals?  
•	 What efforts did the Office of Advocacy make to determine the interests of small 
businesses in these issues (i.e., whether small businesses felt this was a priority for them 
and/or the impact that a cancer designation for these chemicals would have on small 
businesses)?
22  FOIA exemption 5 allows the government to withhold information that concerns communications within or between 
agencies that are protected by legal privileges including the attorney-work product privilege and deliberative process privilege.  See 
Frequently Asked Questions, FOIA.gov, http://www.foia.gov/faq.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
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3. The Office of Advocacy’s Interventions in Scientific Debates 
About Public Health and Toxic Chemicals
In each of the cases 
discussed below, a growing body of 
scientific evidence documented the 
cancer risks of the chemical agents.  
But as the research evidence grew, 
so too did the lobbying efforts of 
large producers.  It appears that 
the Office of Advocacy became 
inappropriately and impermissibly 
entangled in these lobbying 
campaigns.  Before moving into 
three case studies of these activities, 
a word is needed about the Office 
of Advocacy’s Roundtables because they seem to play a critical role in shaping the priorities of the 
Office. 
The Roundtables
Our research suggests that the Office of Advocacy began holding regular roundtables on 
different subjects with industry groups around 1990.  According to its reports, “Some roundtables 
have been scheduled as regularly recurring events, such as Advocacy’s monthly roundtable 
on environmental rules and Advocacy’s occupational safety roundtable, which is generally 
bimonthly.  Other roundtables, such as those concerning transportation and homeland security, 
have been held quarterly, while still others have been held on an ad hoc basis.”23 
The Office of Advocacy issues the invitations to its roundtables, which are usually held 
at the law offices of a firm representing a participating trade association.  From correspondence 
and reports we have obtained,24 it seems that trade association representatives and lobbyists 
sometimes directly ask to give presentations at the roundtables.25  In other cases, Advocacy staff 
have worked with trade association staff to plan presentations, asking for input on the agenda, the 
presenters, and the title.26 
23  Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2008: 
Annual Report of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy on Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and 
Executive Order 13272, at 2 (2009), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/08regflx.pdf.
24  The Office of Advocacy provided the environmental roundtable e-mail list, although it is not the most current version and 
some e-mails may have changed in the past six months.  We were given presentations for the environmental roundtable on July 
29, 2011 at which representatives from the American Composite Manufacturers Association and Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturers 
Association made presentations.  Other miscellaneous roundtable documents were provided as well.
25  E-mail from Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC, to Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy (Mar. 16, 2011) (“I 
spoke to Ann earlier this week about presenting the Cr6 research at your upcoming roundtable.  Did she indicate she would like to 
be part of the program?”).
26  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to Charlie Grizzle, lobbyiest for the Formaldehyde Council, and Jim 
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Most attendees at the roundtables represent trade associations that have large corporate 
members, as well as small business members.  Advocacy does not require that attendees 
represent small businesses.  In one e-mail, a staff member at the Office of Advocacy told a 
lobbyist for General Electric that he was invited to attend a Labor Safety roundtable as long as he 
“maintain[ed] a small business perspective!  ;-)”27  Several small business groups perceived to be 
liberal or aligned with Democrats were not on the e-mail invitation lists for roundtables held in 
2010 and 2011.28  
The discussions at the roundtables are closed to the press, and participants are told 
they cannot publicly comment on the discussions.29  Any party may report to its membership 
what it said, but participants are asked not to report what other participants say or to repeat 
what representatives of the Office of Advocacy say.  Our investigation suggests that Advocacy’s 
positions on policy issues grow out of the discussion at these roundtables. 
  The documents from the roundtables obtained through our Freedom of Information 
Act requests and interviews conducted with participants suggest that presentations on the 
three chemical assessments were dominated by the interests of large chemical manufacturers.  
The presentations strongly criticized the science showing cancer risks; no competing views 
were presented.  Nor was there an effort to determine how cancer assessments may impact 
small businesses within a certain industry or whether such an assessment might open 
markets for substitute chemicals.  The assumption seems to be that a cancer assessment that 
adversely affects a big chemical company will adversely affect small businesses.  From the 
materials we were provided and from interviews, we found no evidence that “[s]mall business 
representatives” initiated conversation at the roundtables  on “the difficulties posed by chemical 
risk characterizations at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and at the 
Environmental Protection Agency”30 as the Office of Advocacy later claimed.
Skillen, Dir., RISE, cc: Jane C. Luxton, Attorney, Pepper Hamilton, LLP (June 25, 2010) (Subject line: Draft Roundtable Notice_
please review) (“Jane, Charlie – you can decide if I should list both of you or just Charlie.  Also, Charlie, I would be interested in 
a formaldehyde update also – if you could handle it.  I would list that separately. . . . Jim – we can add an additional speaker with 
you if you like.  Please review the time frames also.”); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to David Fischer, ACC, Ann Mason, ACC, 
and John Schweitzer, ACMA (June 28, 2011) (“I’m thinking of two presenters on the NTP process for styrene and formaldehyde 
– and to contrast this process with the IRIS risk assessment process, and the merits of the science controversies – for an hour 
slot on the 29th.  Thoughts?”); E-mail from David Fischer to Kevin L. Bromberg, Ann Mason, and John Schweitzer (July 6, 2011) 
(“Kevin, I think discussing NTP process would be very worthwhile but not sure two talks would be necessary since the flaws in 
the formaldehyde process were also apparent in styrene’s as well.  I’m wondering if we want to discuss the larger issue of rampant 
redundancy and inconsistency in hazard/risk assessment within the federal govt.  In particular, is the RoC still relevant?  Thanks.”); 
E-mail from John Schweitzer to Kevin L. Bromberg (July 11, 2011) (“We’ve got a toxicologist standing by for the July 29 SBA 
Roundtable. . . .”); E-mail from John Schweitzer to Kevin L. Bromberg (July 22, 2011) (“I will likely present the styrene issue next 
week, instead of Jim Bus.  Since NTP is not participating, we don’t need to employ our big ‘science guns’.”); E-mail from Kevin L. 
Bromberg to David Fischer and John Schweitzer (July 12, 2011) (asking for suggestions for the title of Advocacy’s environmental 
roundtable scheduled for July 29th, 2011 and offering three titles for consideration).
27  E-mail from Bruce E. Lundegren, Office of Advocacy, to Pat K. Casano, General Electric (Jan. 10, 2011).
28  After testifying at a joint hearing before the House Science Committee and Small Business Committee on April 25, 2012, 
American Sustainable Business Council was invited to attend the Environmental Roundtables.
29  See E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to John Schweitzer, ACMA (Aug. 1, 2011).  In editing a press 
release for ACMA, Mr. Bromberg wrote “we prefer that we stick to what was presented at the Roundtable – and not a reference 
to the discussion at the Roundtable- which we try to keep confidential to aid in having an open discussion (see the bottom of all 
Roundtable notices). Participants are free, however, to make known their own comments.” 
30  Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011, supra note 11, at 5. 
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When a federal agency relies on a group of outside advisors to formulate policy, the 
process is supposed to be governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).31  This law is 
designed to “limit the influence of special interests” in the public policy decision making process.  
The law requires that meetings of advisory groups be open to the public and that advisory 
committees be balanced. 
The Office of Advocacy’s roundtables may represent improperly constituted advisory 
committees.  Advocacy invites a group of private citizens to regularly meet and solicits their input 
on policy positions.  The Office of Advocacy appears to rely on the “consensus views” expressed 
during these meetings to formulate the positions it takes.  Yet Advocacy conducts the roundtables 
behind closed doors and does not disclose records of what is said.  Clearly, the roundtables are 
incompatible with the goals of FACA. 
The Formaldehyde War
Formaldehyde is a colorless, flammable, strong-smelling chemical that is used as 
an adhesive, disinfectant, and preservative.  It is found in the home in products such as 
particleboard, plywood, and glues.  Exposure to formaldehyde can cause sensory and skin 
irritation and chemical sensitivity.  Workers who produce or use formaldehyde are exposed to 
greater levels than the general public.32  In 1981, formaldehyde was listed as reasonably anticipated 
to be a human carcinogen in the NTP Report on Carcinogens.  
The early evidence of the relationship between formaldehyde and cancer actually came 
from the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology (CIIT), a research group founded by 11 
large chemical companies.33  In 1979, it reported that rats exposed to formaldehyde contracted 
cancer.  Shortly after this finding, and a strategy memo put out by a Georgia-Pacific health 
and safety official,34 the CIIT shifted its focus to conducting research showing that humans 
metabolize formaldehyde differently than rats, so that given the same level of exposure, people 
absorb less formaldehyde than rats.  Risk assessments based on actual cancer incidence among 
formaldehyde-exposed workers show risks 50 times higher than those predicted by CIIT’s 
models.35  A lobbying effort to block the regulation of formaldehyde as a cancer-causing substance 
was funded by the Formaldehyde Institute.
31  FACA rules apply when an assemblage of individuals that includes at least one non-federal employee (a) is working as a 
group and (b) is “established or utilized” by agency (c) to provide “advice or recommendations” to the agency.  5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 
3(2) (2006).  
32  See generally Formaldehyde and Cancer Risk, Nat’l Cancer Institute, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/
formaldehyde (last reviewed June 10, 2011); Formaldehyde, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
topics/formaldehyde/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2012).
33  Dan Fagin et al., Toxic Deception: How the Chemical Industry Manipulates Science, Bends the Law, and 
Endangers Your Health 47 (1996).
34  Georgia-Pacific, a subsidiary of Koch Industries, is one of the country’s top producers of formaldehyde.  Other large chemical 
companies who have been active in the fight include Cleanese, Dupont, and other members of the now-defunct Formaldehyde 
Institute.  See Formaldehyde Added to “Known Carcinogens” List Despite Lobbying by Koch Brothers, Chemical Industry, Democracy 
Now (June 14, 2011), available at http://ec.libsyn.com/p/8/5/6/8565271316161e75/dn2011-0614-1.mp3?d13a76d516d9dec20c3d27
6ce028ed5089ab1ce3dae902ea1d01cd8032d8ce5c4d5e&c_id=3325818; Laurie Bennett, The Mighty Formaldehyde Lobby, Muckety 
(Oct. 7, 2012, 7:09 AM), http://news.muckety.com/2012/10/07/the-mighty-formaldehyde-lobby/38441.
35  Fagin et al., supra note 33, at 76.  
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Based on the NTP assessment in 1981, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) sought to regulate workplace exposure to formaldehyde.  Industry 
opposition was so intense that a new exposure limit was only published in response to a court 
order.36  OSHA’s final standard, not issued until 1987, fully considered, and rejected, the industry 
theory; instead, OSHA concluded that formaldehyde posed a significant cancer risk to exposed 
workers.37 
EPA also set out to evaluate formaldehyde’s risks.  In the 1980s, its risk assessment 
accepted the industry theory that formaldehyde posed little cancer risk to humans,38 even though 
EPA’s own Science Advisory Board warned the agency against this approach in 1992.39
Over the past two decades, a growing body of human epidemiology studies has 
consistently shown upper airway and blood cancers among workers exposed to formaldehyde.  
In fact, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) designated formaldehyde a 
“probable human carcinogen” as early as 1987 and in 2006 concluded that there is “sufficient 
evidence in humans” that formaldehyde causes cancer of the nasal passages and “strong but not 
sufficient” evidence for a causal association between leukemia and formaldehyde.40 
By 2008, a paper by EPA concluded that the industry risk model showing minimal human 
risk was “unsupportable.”41  As a result, EPA revised its formaldehyde risk assessment in 2009, 
concluding, as had IARC, that formaldehyde is known to cause cancer of the nasal passages and 
leukemia.  
36  UAW v. Donovan, 756 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
37  UAW v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  Although both OSHA and the courts rejected the formaldehyde 
industry’s self-serving interpretation of the chemical’s cancer risk, economists at OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) accepted it.  OIRA repeatedly cited OSHA’s formaldehyde standard as a rule with large costs but few benefits.  
OIRA’s analysis of the costs and benefits of formaldehyde regulation has been thoroughly discredited.  See Lisa Heinzerling, 
Regulatory Costs of Mythical Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998).
38  See Fagin et al., supra note 33, at 89–91.  
39  Id. at 73.
40  Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Formaldehyde, 2-Butoxyethanol and 1-tert-Butoxypropan-2-ol, 88 IARC 
Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans (2006), available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/
Monographs/vol88/mono88.pdf. 
41  Franklin Mirer, Risky Business: Forming Your Opinion Regarding Cancer and Formaldehyde, The Synergist, Apr. 2009, at 32 
(quoting Kenny S. Crump et al., Sensitivity Analysis of Biologically Motivated Model for Formaldehyde-Induced Respiratory Cancer 
in Humans, 52:6 Annals of Occupational Hygiene 481 (2008)).
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Producers immediately began a campaign to block the new IRIS risk assessment.  Initially, 
the Formaldehyde Institute led the fight against designating formaldehyde as a carcinogen, but 
it disbanded in 1993 after documents showing the industry’s research strategy of obfuscating 
formaldehyde’s risks were produced during discovery in a lawsuit seeking damages for illnesses 
caused by formaldehyde exposure.  The Formaldehyde Council assumed its role as the dominant 
industry trade association in 1995.  It was dominated by big chemical companies that were 
manufacturing formaldehyde.42  In 2010, it ceased operations at the same time that the American 
Chemistry Council (ACC) formed a Formaldehyde Panel funded by Georgia-Pacific (owned by 
Koch Industries) and Hexion Specialty Chemicals.43  Beginning in 2010, efforts to block the IRIS 
and NTP assessments of formaldehyde, at federal agencies and in Congress, were led by lobbyists 
for the ACC.
Sen. David Vitter (R-LA) put a hold on an EPA nominee until the agency asked the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review the IRIS formaldehyde risk assessment shortly 
after a lobbyist for the Formaldehyde Council held a fundraiser on the senator’s behalf.44  Koch 
Industries and a Formaldehyde Council lobbyist also gave generous campaign contributions to 
other senators leading the effort to delay the assessment.45  Responding to this political pressure, 
EPA requested the review, which NAS published in April 2011.46  The NAS review affirmed EPA’s 
conclusion that formaldehyde was a known human carcinogen, causing upper airway cancers, but 
directed EPA to restate its reasons for concluding that formaldehyde caused leukemia in humans.  
EPA has not released revisions to its formaldehyde IRIS assessment since the NAS review was 
completed.
42  The by-laws of the Formaldehyde Council require that members of the Board of Directors represent Tier 1 members of 
the Council.  Companies must pay $200,000 to become Tier 1 members, so it is unlikely that many small businesses sat on the 
Formaldehyde Council’s governing body.
43 See ACC Forms New Formaldehyde Panel, American Chemistry Council, http://www.americanchemistry.com/11312.
44  Joaquin Sapien, How Senator Vitter Battled the EPA over Formaldehyde’s Link to Cancer, ProPublica (Apr. 15, 2010, 2:30 AM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/how-senator-david-vitter-battled-formaldehyde-link-to-cancer.
45  Id. (linking Koch Industries and Charles Grizzle, a lobbyist for the Formaldehyde Council, to campaign contributions to 
Sens. Inhofe and Vitter).
46  Committee to Review EPA’s Draft IRIS Assessment of Formaldehyde, Nat’l Research Council, Review of the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Draft IRIS Assessment of Formaldehyde (2011), available at http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=13142.  Industry interprets the NAS report as critical of EPA’s risk assessment; environmental groups 
such as Natural Resources Defense Council interpret the report as questioning EPA’s discussion of how formaldehyde causes blood 
cancers, without disagreeing with its conclusion that formaldehyde is carcinogenic. 
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At HHS, NTP responded to the IARC listing and 
new research by proposing to move formaldehyde from 
an “anticipated” human carcinogen to a “known human 
carcinogen,” causing upper airway cancers and leukemia, 
as they prepared the 12th Report on Carcinogens.  The 
Formaldehyde Council and the ACC strongly objected, 
filing multiple comments with NTP.  Industry demanded 
that NTP incorporate the NAS analysis of the IRIS risk 
assessment into its evaluation, which it did.  But the ACC 
and Dow Chemical continued to lobby Congress to delay 
publication of the Report on Carcinogens until another NAS review was conducted.47  Republican 
House representatives unsuccessfully pushed an appropriations rider to delay the Report’s 
release.48 
Advocacy Involvement
The Office of Advocacy waded into the debate in November 2011 with formal comments 
claiming that “[s]mall businesses have taken issue with . . . formaldehyde’s listing as ‘known to be 
a human carcinogen’” and that they were “concerned with the quality of scientific analysis” relied 
upon by NTP.49 
Our review of the materials gathered from 
our Freedom of Information Act request shows no 
documents from any small businesses asking the Office 
of Advocacy to intervene in the formaldehyde listing, 
nor did any small business file comments with NTP 
criticizing its analysis.50  Instead, internal Advocacy 
documents show that Advocacy communicated regularly 
with registered lobbyists for the Formaldehyde Council 
and ACC.51  
47  See Jennifer Sass, Health Scientists Sign on to Tell Congress Not to Strip Funding for the Report on Carcinogens, Switchboard: 
Natural Resources Defense Council Staff Blog (Sept. 5, 2012), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jsass/health_scientists_sign_on_
to_t.html.
48  Committee on Appropriations, 112th Congress, Working Bill on Appropriations for Departments of Labor, 
Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies FY 2013, (Comm. Print 2012), available at http://
appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-112hr-sc-ap-fy13-laborhhsed.pdf.
49  Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of 
Advocacy, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Nov. 22, 2011), http://
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Advocacy_Comment_Letter-Report_On_Carcinogens.pdf.
50  The only comments NTP received were from trade associations, large chemical companies, consulting firms, and 
academic and research institutions.  See Formaldehyde [CAS No. 50-00-0], Public Comments: Substances Newly Reviewed 
for the 12th RoC, Nat’l Toxicology Program, http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/index.cfm?objectid=20A477F2-F1F6-975E-
7472FC6B0DA56D9C#formaldehyde (last updated July 19, 2012).  
51  See E-mails between Kevin Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, and Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC (May 2011); 
E-mails between Kevin Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, and Charles Grizzle, registered lobbyist for the Formaldehyde Council 
(June-Aug. 2010).   
“I guess he’s essentially 
wrong. It’s probably better 
for now that I keep the NTP 
contact in the dark.”
-e-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, to 
David Fischer, ACC
“NTP Excerpt – What is the 
detailed industry argument 
that this is incorrect?” 
-e-mail subject line from Kevin L. 
Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to 
Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist 
for ACC
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Moreover, documents show that the Office of Advocacy made no effort to evaluate the 
scientific evidence behind the NTP assessment.  Instead, Advocacy asked lobbyists for ACC to 
provide a “detailed industry” rebuttal to NTP.52  In May 2011, Advocacy staff followed up with 
ACC and its lobbyists about their meetings with agency officials regarding formaldehyde.53  
Advocacy also collaborated on press strategy with ACC54 and discussed whether and when to 
share materials with agency staff.55 
Styrene Skirmishes
Styrene is a clear, liquid, volatile organic compound used predominantly in the 
manufacture of plastics and rubber.56  Synthetic styrene derived from oil and natural gas is 
most commonly found in carpet backing, fiberglass composites (e.g., bathtubs and kitchen 
countertops), and even in polystyrene food containers.  Styrene may be released into the 
environment during manufacture, use, or disposal, contaminating air and drinking water. 
As far back as 1988, studies showed styrene caused cancer in laboratory mice.57  Human 
studies in the years since have suggested that occupational exposure to styrene can lead to 
increased risk of lymphomas, leukemia, and pancreatic or esophageal cancers.58  The IARC has 
listed styrene as “possibly carcinogenic to humans” since 2002.59  Growing evidence from animal 
studies and limited evidence of cancer risks among workers caused NTP to propose listing 
styrene as “reasonably anticipated” to cause cancer in its 12th Report on Carcinogens.  
52  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC, and cc: David 
Fischer, ACC (May 25, 2011). The e-mail contained the subject line, “NTP Excerpt – What is the detailed industry argument that 
this is incorrect?”
53  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC (May 24, 2011) 
(“News from the meeting?”); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to David Fischer, ACC (May 24, 3011) (“Was 
there an ACC meeting today with HHS? Any news?”).
54  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to David Fischer, ACC, and Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for 
ACC (May 25, 2011) (Kevin Bromberg: “Will the news about an RoC delay get into the press? Do you want it there?”). 
55  E-mail from David Fischer, ACC, to Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy (May 25, 2011) (David Fischer: “Who at NTP 
were you thinking of sharing it with? John Bucher of NTP essentially told House committee staff that the NRC’s report was not 
relevant to the NTP RoC.”); E-mail reply from Kevin L. Bromberg to David Fischer (May 25, 2011) (Kevin Bromberg: “I guess he’s 
essentially wrong. It’s probably better for now that I keep the NTP contact in the dark.”).
56  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Toxicological Profile 
for Styrene 1–8 (2010), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp53.pdf; Nat’l Toxicology Program, U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Services, Styrene: Key Points (June 2011), available at http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/materials/
styrene_508.pdf; Frequently Asked Questions, Styrene Info. & Res. Center, http://www.styrene.org/faq.html#one (last visited Jan. 7, 
2013).
57  Barbara Conti et al., Long-Term Carcinogenicity Bioassays on Styrene Administered by Inhalation, Ingestion and Injection and 
Styrene Oxide Administered by Ingestion in Sprague-Dawley Rats, and Para-Methylstyrene Administered by Ingestion in Sprague-
Dawley Rats and Swiss Mice, 534 Annals of the N.Y. Acad. of Sci. 203–34 (1988).
58  Nat’l Toxicology Program, supra note 50. 
59  Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Some Traditional Herbal Medicines, Some Mycotoxins, Napthalene, and 
Styrene, 82 IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans 437–522 (2002), available at http://
monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/vol82/mono82.pdf.
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Not surprisingly, companies producing styrene vigorously disputed its danger to humans.  
Like formaldehyde producers, they argued that humans metabolize the toxin differently than 
animals, so higher exposures are less toxic to people than to laboratory mice.  The Styrene 
Information and Research Council (SIRC) spent over $20 million on 47 studies examining the 
health and environmental effects of styrene exposure; none found clear cancer risks.60  Yet other 
evidence tells a different story.61 
In fact, OSHA has regulated styrene’s “narcotic” health effects on workers since 1971.62  By 
1989, with evidence of cancer risks increasing, OSHA proposed to revisit its limits on permissible 
exposure to styrene.63  But industry associations strongly objected to OSHA characterizing styrene 
as carcinogenic, arguing there was insufficient data to support such a classification.64  OSHA 
backed down; its final rule reducing styrene exposure, later overturned in court, relied only on 
“its narcotic effects” as justification.65  
In 1998, SIRC convinced EPA to allow SIRC to conduct the IRIS hazard assessment of 
styrene.66  The industry assessment was of such poor quality that it was unusable.  However, the 
tactic delayed EPA’s IRIS assessment update of the cancer risks of styrene for some time.67 
60  Summary of SIRC-Supported Research, Styrene Info. & Res. Center, http://www.styrene.org/science/research_summary.html 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
61  See supra notes 57–59.
62  Air Contaminants, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 tbl. Z-1 (1999).
63  The update was referred to by OSHA as the PEL project and OSHA sought to substitute outdated consensus standards, first 
adopted by the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) in the 1960s, with consensus standards 
current in the late 1980s.  Final Rule, Air Contaminants, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332–2983 (Jan. 19, 1989), revoked 58 Fed. Reg. 35338–
35351 (June 30, 1993).
64  Letter from John B. Jenks, Chairman, Styrene Info. & Research Ctr. et al., to Joseph A. Dear, Assistant Sec’y of Occupational 
Safety & Health, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Jan. 30, 1996), available at http://www.acmanet.org/ga/osha_styrene_agreement_docs_1996.
pdf. 
65  OSHA’s PEL update was invalidated by the 11th Circuit.  AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992); see also 
Revocation of Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 35338–35351 (June 30, 1993).
66  See Jennifer Sass & Daniel Rosenberg, Natural Resources Defense Council, The Delay Game: How the 
Chemical Industry Ducks Regulation of the Most Toxic Substances 15 (2011), available at http://www.nrdc.org/health/
files/IrisDelayReport.pdf.
67  Id. at 16.
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Since styrene was nominated for inclusion in the 12th Report on Carcinogens in 2004, 
SIRC filed 22 comments arguing against listing the substance.68  As the Report neared publication, 
the industry group doubled its lobbying expenditures, increasing its funding from $200,000 in 
2010 to over $400,000 in 2011.69  Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA), Rep. John Shadegg (R-AZ), and 34 
other members of Congress sent a letter to HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius criticizing the NTP 
assessment of styrene’s risks,70 and the American Composite Manufacturers Association (ACMA) 
campaigned “aggressively to overturn the NTP listing.”71  When the Report on Carcinogens was 
finally released on June 10, 2011, it listed styrene as “reasonably anticipated” to cause cancer.  The 
same day, SIRC and Dart Corporation filed suit challenging this assessment of styrene’s risks.72
Dow Chemical is a founding member of SIRC.  Two of the association’s websites are 
registered to the Management Informations Systems Director at the American Chemistry 
Council.  SIRC’s offices, coincidentally, were in the same location in Arlington, VA, as those of the 
Formaldehyde Council.  And one of its lobbying firms also lobbied for ACC, while another of its 
firms lobbied for Dow Chemical.
Advocacy Involvement 
The Office of Advocacy was asked by lobbyists from SIRC and ACMA to comment on 
the NTP assessment of styrene and did so.  A consultant from a lobbying firm hired by SIRC first 
contacted the Office of Advocacy on June 4, 2010, regarding the styrene listing under review for 
the 12th Report on Carcinogens.73  Following that contact, the same consultant helped ACMA 
representatives plan a meeting with Advocacy on Sept. 15, 2010, to discuss ACMA’s concerns 
about the styrene assessment.74  
68  Intervenor-Defendants’ Reply in Support of Defendants’ & Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at 6, Styrene Info. & 
Research Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 11-1079 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2012).
69  SIRC’s lobbying expenditures had been minimal before 2010.  Lobbying: Styrene Information and Research Center (2011), 
Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000057259&year=2011 (last visited Jan. 7, 
2012); Lobbying: Styrene Information and Research Center (2010), Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clientsum.php?id=D000057259&year=2010 (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
70  Letter from Rep. Rick Boucher and Rep. John Shadegg et al., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Apr. 21, 2010) (requesting that the listing of styrene be deferred for review until the 13th 
Report on Carcinogens).
71  ACMA Continues Fight on NTP Styrene Listing, Am. Composites Manufacturers Ass’n (ACMA), http://www.acmanet.org/
ga/styrene.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).  ACMA had lobbying expenses relating to NTP of at least $56,000 in 2010 and $70,000 in 
2011.  Lobbying: American Composites Manufacturers Assn (2011), Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clientsum.php?id=D000023940&year=2011 (last visited Jan. 7, 2013); Lobbying: American Composites Manufacturers Assn (2010), 
Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000023940&year=2010 (last visited Jan. 7, 
2013).
72  Complaint, Styrene Info. & Research Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 11-1079 (D.D.C. June 10, 2011), available at http://www.
styrene.org/news/pdfs/06-10-11-SIRCvSebeliusComplaint.pdf.
73  E-mail from Burleson Smith to Kevin L. Bromberg (June 4, 2010) (attaching letters sent by the Styrene Information and 
Research Council and members of Congress to the Secretary of Health and Human Services requesting that the styrene listing be 
deferred and re-reviewed in the 13th Report on Carcinogens).
74  E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 14, 2010) (sending over the list of attendees for the meeting); 
E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 15, 2010) (attaching the ACMA Issue Summary in advance of the 
meeting outlining ACMA’s “previous efforts to ask NTP to review all of the data . . . .”). 
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At the meeting, directors of ACMA or its lobbyists asked Advocacy to schedule an 
interagency meeting with the Office of Management and Budget and NTP to discuss the 
assessment and to submit a request to Sebelius asking her to drop the styrene listing.75  After a 
second meeting on Nov. 30, 2010, ACMA directors submitted letters to the Office of Advocacy 
asking the Office to get involved with the styrene listing.76  Staff at Advocacy quickly did as they 
were asked and forwarded ACMA’s letter to HHS on the same day.77  In its letter, ACMA claimed 
the NTP listing would jeopardize 500,000 jobs.  That figure represents more than 75 percent of all 
jobs SIRC identifies as styrene-related.   
When these efforts failed to block the listing, industry lobbyists asked for help in securing 
changes to the assessment procedures so that they could have more opportunities to influence the 
process, even though the industry trade associations and research groups had already commented 
extensively on NTP’s proposed listing.  The ACC launched a lobbying campaign to get Congress 
to change the procedures; SIRC actively lobbied in support of this effort.78 
No individual small business contacted Advocacy about the styrene listing.  The Office of 
Advocacy received correspondence about the styrene assessment only from SIRC and ACMA.  
Small businesses did not file comments on styrene with NTP independent of ACMA.79 
75  E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 15, 2010).  The e-mail includes an attachment describing ACMA’s 
actions related to the styrene listing and asks the Small Business Administration to: “Elevate this issue as a priority within the 
Office of Advocacy and assign a member of your staff to champion this effort; Contact the Office of Management and Budget 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OMB-OIRA) and request an interagency meeting with NTP to evaluate these 
claims; Submit a request to the Secretary of Health and Human Services Sebelius to postpone making her determination regarding 
styrene until the 13th RoC in order to implement the improvements to the process and to review all of the data for styrene before 
making a determination regarding the potential for carcinogenicity in keeping with other review processes.”  Cf.  Letter from 
Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Dec. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/hhs10_1201.pdf.
76  E-mail from Burleson Smith to David J. Rostker (Nov. 30, 2010) (sending a follow-up email from the meeting earlier that day 
with an attachment to an Information Quality Act Request for Corrections that SIRC submitted to HHS in October 2009); E-mail 
from Angie Castillo to David J. Rostker (Dec. 1, 2010) (attaching separate letters from Tom Dobbins and Monty Felix to the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy).  
77  E-mail from Angie Castillo to David J. Rostker (Dec. 1, 2010) (attaching separate letters from Tom Dobbins and Monty Felix 
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy).  Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, to Kathleen 
Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://www.sba.
gov/sites/default/files/hhs10_1201.pdf.  Advocacy’s comment letter “encourage[s] NTP to consider all relevant scientific data in 
making its recommendations, including studies that show negative or null results” and to “carefully consider these concerns as the 
12th Report on Carcinogens is finalized and the preparations for the 13th report are begun.”  Id.  ACMA quickly thanked Advocacy 
for its help.  E-mail from Tom Dobbins to David J. Rostker (Dec. 2, 2010) (“Thanks to you, Dr. Sargeant and the rest of the team 
for the quick turnaround on this important letter.”).
78  Kate Sheppard, Republicans Attempt to Ax Program Monitoring Carcinogens, Mother Jones (Aug. 24, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://
www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2012/08/republicans-attempt-ax-program-monitoring-carcinogens; Sarah Vogel, Hands 
off the Report on Carcinogens, Environmental Defense Fund (Sept. 5, 2012), http://blogs.edf.org/nanotechnology/2012/09/05/
hands-off-the-report-on-carcinogens/; Nicholas D. Kristof, The Cancer Lobby, N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/10/07/opinion/sunday/kristof-the-cancer-lobby.html?_r=0; see also sources cited supra note 69.
79  Scientific Reviews for Listings in the 12th Report on Carcinogens: Public Comments, Nat’l Toxicology Program, http://ntp.niehs.
nih.gov/index.cfm?objectid=20A477F2-F1F6-975E-7472FC6B0DA56D9C#styrene (last updated July 19, 2012).
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Advocacy filed a second set of comments after the Report on Carcinogens was published 
and SIRC had filed its lawsuit challenging the styrene classification.  In its comments in 
November 2011, Advocacy criticized the NTP listing of styrene again, in the same letter it sent 
criticizing the formaldehyde listing, expressing concern about “the quality of [the Report on 
Carcinogens’] scientific analysis, the robustness of the scientific process, including procedures for 
peer review and public comment procedures, and that [the Report on Carcinogens] is duplicative 
of other federal chemical risk assessment programs, particularly the IRIS.”80  These comments 
repeated the talking points provided by ACMA and SIRC.81 
The Office of Advocacy became involved in the styrene issue in response to a request by 
the affected trade associations, which are dominated by big businesses or their lobbyists, and its 
comments repeated their arguments.  At a hearing on the Report on Carcinogens, held by the 
House Science Committee and Small Business Committee in April 2012, Advocacy staff admitted 
they made no effort to verify industry’s claims.82  After hearing the testimony, Rep. Brad Miller 
(D-NC) commented that the Office of Advocacy “relied for their scientific judgment and process 
comments on the information provided by Styrene lobbyists, so their testimony was really just an 
echo of what we heard from the Dow Chemical industry scientist.”83 
80  Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of 
Advocacy, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Nov. 22, 2011), http://
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Advocacy_Comment_Letter-Report_On_Carcinogens.pdf; Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of Advocacy, to Dr. Ruth Lunn, Director, Office 
of the Report on Carcinogens 4 (Dec. 14, 2011), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/NTP/RoC/Thirteenth/Process/PublicComm/
SBA20111214.pdf.  
81  E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 15, 2010).  This e-mail includes an attachment of an ACMA Issue 
Summary to be discussed at the meeting with Advocacy on Sept. 15, 2010.  The document identifies four major areas of concern: 
[1] The styrene listing will raise unnecessary concerns about the safety of styrene among employees and communities exposed 
to the chemical; [2] NTP’s position on styrene is inconsistent with a European report and a Blue Ribbon Panel report on styrene 
because NTP failed to adequately consider negative studies; [3] NTP’s review process causes concerns about the scientific quality 
and validity of its findings on styrene; and [4] Businesses that have participated in the NTP process have not been assured that 
their comments were considered during the review process.  These talking points were reiterated in a presentation by ACMA 
at Advocacy’s environmental roundtable on July 29th, 2011.  Advocacy’s letter on November 22, 2011 regarding styrene and 
formaldehyde mirror the talking points made in these two documents.  
82  Webcast, How the Report on Carcinogens Uses Science to Meet its Statutory Obligations, and its Impact on Small Business 
Jobs, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology and the 
Subcomm. on Healthcare and Technology of the H. Comm. on Small Business, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter Hearing on Report on 
Carcinogens] (statement of Charles A. Maresca, Dir., Interagency Affairs, Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin.), available at 
http://science.edgeboss.net/wmedia/science/sst2012/042512.wvx.
83  Press Release, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Minority, Subcommittee Misses Opportunity to Understand 
the Impact of National Toxicology Program’s Report on Carcinogens (Apr. 25, 2012), http://democrats.science.house.gov/press-
release/subcommittee-misses-opportunity-understand-impact-national-toxicology-program%E2%80%99s-report.  
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Chromium Battles
 Chromium is a naturally occurring heavy metal, found in two widely used classes of 
compounds: trivalent chromium (chromium-3) and the more carcinogenic hexavalent chromium 
(chromium-6).84  Hexavalent chromium is used for chrome plating, dyes and pigments, treating 
wood, and for producing steel and other alloys.85  Hexavalent chromium exposure can come from 
inhaling or ingesting the substance.  Inhalation of hexavalent chromium has long been recognized 
as a cancer risk to workers in the chromium industry.  In fact, hexavalent chromium has been 
listed as a “known human carcinogen” in NTP’s Report on Carcinogens since 1980,86 and the EPA 
IRIS database has calculated maximum limits for chromium inhalation since 1998.87  
OSHA began regulating worker exposure to chromium in 1971, after it adopted a 
consensus standard as a mandatory workplace limit.88  The National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health recommended OSHA improve its chromium-6 standard in 1975 to better 
protect workers,89 but no new OSHA standard was forthcoming.  In 1993, Public Citizen and the 
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers sued OSHA to compel it to set new exposure standards to 
reduce workers’ chromium cancer risk.90  
The Chrome Coalition, a trade association of chromium manufacturers, immediately 
hired consultants to publicize the findings from 18 studies on the health effects of hexavalent 
chromium it had commissioned; all found minimal cancer risks.91  Industry groups also urged 
OSHA to delay action until an EPA study on chromium’s cancer risk had been completed.  When 
the study showed cancer risks, industry interests urged further delays and more analysis.  
84  See generally Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Chromium, Nickel and Welding, 49
IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans (1990), available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/
ENG/Monographs/vol49/mono49.pdf.
85  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Toxicological 
Profile for Chromium 1–8 (2012), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp7.pdf.  
86  Notice, First Annual Report on Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,372 (Sept. 16, 1980); see also IARC, supra note 84 (explaining 
that hexavalent chromium was identified in the IARC monographs as a known human carcinogen in 1973, and supplementing the 
monograph with new evidence in support of the original classification). 
87  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, IRIS Toxicological Review of Hexavalent Chromium (1998), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/iris/toxreviews/0144tr.pdf.
88  Air Contaminants, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 tbl. Z-1 (1999).  Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 146-
47, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 26778 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2002) (explaining that OSHA’s 1971 standard for hexavalent chromium was 
based on a recommended standard by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 1943.  ANSI’s standard followed from 
reports from the 1920’s about hexavalent chromium’s acute effects). 
89  Nat’l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Pub. No. 76-129, Criteria for a 
Recommended Standard: Occupational Exposure to Chromium (VI) (1975), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
docs/1970/76-129.html. 
90  Occupational Safety and Health Law § 13 (Randy S. Rabinowitz & Scott H. Durham eds., 2d ed. Supp. 2008).  OSHA 
had attempted to set a new standard for chromium-6 as part of a cumulative carcinogen standard in 1977, but the Supreme Court 
invalidated the OSHA rulemaking, finding that the agency must perform an individual risk assessment for each chemical standard 
it develops.  See David Michaels, Doubt is Their Product: How Industry’s Assault on Science Threatens Your Health 
97–100 (2008).
91  Michaels, supra note 90, at 100–01; David Michaels et al., Commentary, Selected Science: An Industry Campaign to 
Undermine an OSHA Hexavalent Chromium Standard, Envtl. Health: A Global Access Sci. Source 2 (2006), available at http://
www.ehjournal.net/content/pdf/1476-069X-5-5.pdf.
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As the debate over the cancer risks of inhaling chromium-6 progressed, another battle 
opened up.  The movie Erin Brockovich, which premiered in 2000, described the struggle of 
residents of Hinkley, CA, to get compensation from Pacific Gas & Electric after it contaminated 
the town’s drinking water with chromium, making many residents ill.  The case settled for $333 
million in 1993, making it the largest class-action in U.S. history at the time.92  
By 2010, an NTP study showed that ingestion of drinking water contaminated with 
hexavalent chromium caused cancer in laboratory animals,93 and staff at EPA believed there 
was enough information to calculate a reference concentration (maximum exposure level) for 
chromium ingestion.  If EPA was able to do this, new drinking water standards for chromium 
levels nationwide would likely follow.
Industry objected,94 arguing that chromium is metabolized by humans into a less toxic 
form of the metal, thus posing minimal cancer risk from drinking water.  Their “evidence” was 
a 1997 re-analysis (shown to be fraudulent in 200595) of a 1987 Chinese study.96  The American 
Chemistry Council’s Hexavalent Chromium Panel, the apparent successor to the Chrome 
Coalition, led the objections, urging EPA to delay its IRIS assessment until an industry-funded 
study had been completed.97  Since October 2010, the American Chemistry Council has filed 25 
separate comments objecting to the IRIS assessment of hexavalent chromium – almost half of 
the total number of comments filed.98  EPA bowed to industry pressure and agreed to indefinitely 
delay its IRIS assessment.99 
92  Sedina Banks, The “Erin Brockovich Effect”: How Media Shapes Toxics Policy, 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 219, 230 
(2003).  In 2003, Honeywell International, Inc., was ordered to pay $400 million for cleanup of chromium in New Jersey.  Rebecca 
Sutton, Environmental Working Group, Chromium-6 in U.S. Tap Water 17 (2010), available at http://static.ewg.org/
reports/2010/chrome6/chrome6_report_2.pdf.  A similar class action suit was filed against Honeywell & PPG Industries in 2010.  
Smith v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-03345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51854 (D.N.J. May 13, 2011).
93  Nat’l Toxicology Program, NTP TR 546, Technical Report on the Toxicology and Carcinogenesis Studies of 
Sodium Dichromate Dihydrate (CAS No. 7789-12-0) in F344/N Rats and B6C3F1 Mice (Drinking Water Studies) (July 
2008), http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/htdocs/LT_rpts/tr546.pdf; Press Release, Nat’l Institute of Health, Hexavalent Chromium in 
Drinking Water Causes Cancer in Lab Animals (May 16, 2007), http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/may2007/niehs-16.htm.  
94  See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Public Docket Folder, Draft Toxicological Review of Chromium: 
In Support of Summary Information on the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), EPA-HQ-ORD-2010-0540, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;D=EPA-HQ-ORD-2010-0540 (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
95  Id.  As a result of the fraudulent study, the Journal pulled it from publication and issued a letter regarding the incident.  P. 
Brandt-Rauf, Editorial Retraction, Cancer Mortality in a Chinese Population Exposed to Hexavalent Chromium in Water, 48(7) J. 
Occupational & Envtl. Medicine 749 (2006).
96  See Environmental Working Group, Chrome-Plated Fraud: How PG&E’s Scientists-For-Hire Reversed Findings 
of Cancer Study (2005), http://www.ewg.org/book/export/html/8626.  
97  Letter from Ann Mason, Senior Director, Am. Chemistry Council, to Rebecca Clark, Acting Director, Nat’l Ctr. 
for Envtl. Assessment, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 23, 2010), available at http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-ORD-2010-0540-0027 (select the pdf icon by “view attachment” to download the attached 
file).  American Chemistry Council’s Hexavalent Chromium Panel funded this new, $4 million study, which was conducted by 
Tox Strategies and a team of scientists with ties to industry.  According to ACC’s website, “The panel’s primary activities include 
sponsoring research to fill the scientific database informing the risk levels for hexavalent chromium in drinking water and 
communicating the findings of this research.”  Hexavalent Chromium, AmericanChemistry.com, http://www.americanchemistry.
com/HexavalentChromium.  ACC also began a letter writing campaign from industry organizations to EPA asking the agency 
to delay its assessment until the new industry study is complete.  See, e.g., E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Kevin L. Bromberg 
(Sept. 15, 2011) (attaching several letters from trade associations all asking EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to postpone the IRIS 
assessment of chromium until ACC completes its ongoing research project and EPA has had an opportunity to consider the data).
98  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Public Docket Folder, supra note 94.
99  IRISTrack Detailed Report: Chromium VI Assessment Milestones and Dates, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, http://cfpub.epa.
gov/ncea/iristrac/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewChemical.showChemical&sw_id=1114 (last updated Jan. 8, 2013).
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Advocacy Involvement
The Office of Advocacy became involved in the debate about the cancer risks of ingesting 
chromium after being contacted by the same ACC lobbyist who had urged Advocacy to become 
involved in the debate about formaldehyde risks.100  In June 2011, the lobbyist suggested Advocacy 
staff write a letter to EPA asking that it delay completion of the chromium assessment until after 
the ACC study had been completed.101  The request did not mention any small business concerns.
Advocacy did not attempt to research or validate the ACC’s position on chromium.  Staff 
at the Office of Advocacy did ask if there was evidence showing a link between chromium-laced 
drinking water and cancer and was assured that new industry-funded research would answer 
these questions.102  This apparently satisfied Advocacy staff.103 
Staff at the Office of Advocacy also asked if any small businesses were affected by the 
chromium risk assessment.  ACC assured Advocacy that they were, and Advocacy staff asked 
no more questions.104  No small business contacted the Office of Advocacy to challenge the IRIS 
chromium assessment.  A few small businesses filed comments with EPA on the IRIS chromium 
assessment, echoing the comments already filed by ACC asking EPA to delay the IRIS assessment 
until after completion of ACC’s new study. 
On Oct. 5, 2011, Advocacy submitted a letter to EPA expressing the concerns of “small 
business representatives” over EPA’s IRIS evaluation that hexavalent chromium is carcinogenic.105  
The Office of Advocacy went on to claim that EPA did not have sufficient data to estimate the 
risk from ingestion of chromium and argued that EPA should not rely on a linear model to 
estimate the cancer risks of exposure to low doses of chromium.  The Office asked EPA to delay 
its final assessment until a new industry study was completed and its results incorporated into the 
assessment.  
100  E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Bruce E. Lundegrun (Feb. 3, 2011) (“May I impose on you to help arrange a meeting 
with your Advocacy Office colleagues who handle environmental issues?  The Senate EPW Committee held a hearing on drinking 
water contaminants yesterday at which Administrator Jackson testified.  My interest in setting up the meeting has been raised 
substantially as a result of her testimony.  As you may recall, I represent the American Chemistry Council’s Hexavalent Chromium 
Panel, and Cr6 was one of the topics of the hearing.”).
101  E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Kevin L. Bromberg (June 28, 2011) (“I would like you to be aware EPA’s Cr6 risk 
assessment is moving forward apparently without waiting for ACC’s MOA and PK studies to be completed and accepted 
for publication, notwithstanding the agency’s own peer reviewers strong recommendation.  NFIB recently sent a letter to 
Administrator Jackson calling upon her to stop the Cr6 risk assessment process to do exactly as EPA’s peer reviewers deemed 
advisable. . . .Since it appears EPA needs to hear from more constituents for it to listen to its own peer review team, would SBA be 
willing to send a letter to Ms. Jackson to weigh in on this matter?”).
102  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Jeff Hannapel, Steve Via, and Randy Schumacher (Feb. 25, 2011) (“Birnbaum told the 
committee that studies, other than EWG, have found a ‘statistically significant association between hexavalent chromium in 
drinking water and cancer.’  Does anyone have these studies , or the references to these studies?”); E-mail from Randy Schumacher 
to Kevin L. Bromberg (Feb. 25, 2011) (“ACC’s research is examining why this occurs and whether Cr6 at low doses (consistent 
with existing drinking water standards) has the same carcinogenic effects and mode if [sic] action. . . .”).
103  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Randy Schumacher (Feb. 25, 2011) (“thx.”) (responding to chain of e-mails on the 
association between hexavalent chromium in drinking water and cancer).
104  E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Ann Mason and Randal Schumacher (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Since this is the oral ingestion 
standard, is this toxicological review even relevant to platers, like NAMF?  Isn’t that only inhalation risk – and a separate risk 
assessment, that I believe is under development?  Isn’t this review solely of interest to drinking water suppliers?”).  Reply e-mail 
from Ann Mason to Kevin L. Bromberg and Randal Schumacher (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Yes the oral tox review will impact drinking 
water systems AND will impact all cleanup and possible effluent standards.  So the industries interested in the Cr6 oral tox review 
include all of the Cr6 user industries, including all industries that do plating or use chromium.”).  
105  Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office 
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The ACC lobbyist provided the Office of Advocacy with these talking points and edited its 
draft letter to EPA.106  Advocacy’s final letter to EPA precisely mirrors the text forwarded to it by 
the ACC and is remarkably similar to ACC’s comments to EPA.107
of Advocacy, to Paul Anastas, Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.sba.gov/
advocacy/816/27201. 
106  See E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Kevin L. Bromberg (Sept. 15, 2011) (attaching several letters from trade associations 
all asking EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to postpone the IRIS assessment of chromium until ACC completes its ongoing 
research project and EPA has had an opportunity to consider the data); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Ann Mason and Randy 
Schumacher (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Ann, Randy – a question on Cr 6:  ‘Initial results show that Cr(VI) is not mutagenic at low [ ] and 
that the human stomach has a substantial ability to reduce Cr(VI) to the benign chromium-3.  Confirmation of a threshold would 
mean that there is no cancer risk at low doses, contrary to the current EPA model.’  Would you edit these sentences – or is this 
accurate?”); E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Ann Mason (Oct. 3, 2011) (providing his suggested edits to Kevin Bromberg’s 
text); E-mail from Ann Mason to Randal Schumacher and Kevin L. Bromberg (Oct. 3, 2011) (“This text is ok with me as edited 
by Randy.  Note that some of the EPA peer reviewers were particularly emphatic about this point.  Kevin, did you want/need to 
include a quote from them?”); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Randal Schumacher and Ann Mason (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Can you 
get some good quotes from scientists not named in the NRDC letter?  Also, is there a good argument about the gastric issue that 
you could offer?”).  
107  Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office 
of Advocacy, to Paul Anastas, Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.sba.gov/
advocacy/816/27201; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Public Docket Folder, supra note 94.
27
4. Did the Office of Advocacy’s Actions Really Serve the 
Interests of Small Businesses?
Like most Americans, we 
believe a vibrant small business 
sector supports a more resilient 
economy.  The assistance the 
Small Business Administration 
provides to small business owners 
is an important public service, 
increasingly so when markets are 
dominated by large corporations.  
The mission of the Office of 
Advocacy is to ensure that other 
federal agencies consider small 
business concerns.  
However, this investigation reveals that, rather than aligning its mission with the work 
of other federal agencies, the Office of Advocacy actually worked with large business interests to 
obstruct and delay the work of at least two agencies tasked with protecting the health and safety 
of the American people.  One part of government should not be working to undermine the efforts 
of another.
The correspondence into and out of the Office of Advocacy that we have examined 
paints a picture of a federal agency extremely responsive to the agenda of trade associations 
dominated by big chemical manufacturers and their lobbyists.  No small business asked the Office 
of Advocacy to intervene with the NTP Report on Carcinogens or the EPA IRIS assessments of 
cancer risks.  Advocacy’s comments on these assessments offered no small business perspective to 
NTP or IRIS.  No small business filed an independent comment critical of the formaldehyde and 
styrene assessments; a few small businesses did comment on the chromium assessment.  In each 
case, the Office of Advocacy made no attempt to determine whether the views of the American 
Chemistry Council, the American Composite Manufacturers Association, or the Formaldehyde 
Council actually represented the views or interests of small businesses.  
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The Office of Advocacy’s close coordination of its efforts with lobbyists seeking legislation 
to obtain the same results suggests its staff engaged in impermissible lobbying.  Advocacy’s efforts 
to block the NTP and IRIS assessments were initiated by the American Chemistry Council and 
groups or lobbyists associated with it.  ACC is made up of 140 chemical companies; it claims that 
70 of its members are “small and medium sized businesses” but doesn’t specify what it means 
by “small” or “medium.”  Its membership is dominated by the largest chemical companies in the 
country, including Dow, DuPont, Exxon Mobil, Georgia-Pacific, and more.  Its federal lobbying 
expenditures in the fourth quarter of 2011 were the fifth highest of any group filing lobbying 
reports.  Its Formaldehyde Panel is funded by Georgia-Pacific and Hexion, both large companies.  
Dow is a major player in both ACC and the Styrene Information and Research Council.  ACC’s 
Chromium Panel succeeded the Chrome Coalition.  There is no evidence of any small business 
role in any of the ACC coalitions.
This is not surprising since small businesses do not share the anti-regulatory views of large 
chemical companies.  A survey by the American Sustainable Business Council concluded that: 
Organizations like the American Chemistry Council have made anti-
regulation legislation in Congress and state legislatures a top priority, 
pushing the myth that all regulations are a threat to small business growth 
. . . .  But the reality is that small business owners see the value of sound 
regulations to help guide the market to deliver innovation for safer 
chemicals and products, which consumers are demanding. This data shows 
that no matter what your political affiliation is, there is agreement that 
toxic chemicals need to be regulated to prevent risk for business and the 
public.108    
Even the Office of Advocacy’s own research shows that challenging cancer assessments is 
simply not a priority of actual small business owners.  According to an initiative to identify the 
interest of small business (referred to as the r3 initiative109),  the top regulatory issues of concern 
to small business related to their ability to compete against large businesses for government 
contracts; EPA rules, particularly its “Once in, Always in” policy,110 were also a concern.  
Advocacy received no nominations related to scientific assessments.111 
108  Toxic Chemical Reform Good for Business—New Poll, American Sustainable Business Council (ASBC) (Nov. 13, 2012), 
http://asbcouncil.org/node/845. 
109  Small Business Regulatory Review and Reform Initiative, SBA Office of Advocacy, http://archive.sba.gov/advo/r3/.  The r3 
Initiative began under Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Tom Sullivan, but did not continue after he resigned in 2008.  The initiative 
was designed to allow small businesses to nominate rules for review, which Advocacy would then review and publish as a top ten 
list in its annual RFA report.  Post Hearing Questions and Answers for the Record Submitted to Sen. Olympia Snowe by Winslow 
Sargeant, Jan.25, 2011 (Next Steps for Main Street: Reducing the Regulatory and Administrative Burdens on America’s Small 
Businesses: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship (Nov. 18, 2010)), available at http://
www.sba.gov/advocacy/2675/14163; see also New Small Business Program Will Influence Agency Regulatory Reviews, OMB Watch 
(Sept. 11, 2007), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3419.
110  See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Potential to Emit for MACT Standards -- Guidance on Timing 
Issues (May 16, 1995) for an explanation of the Once in, Always in air quality policy, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/caaa/t3/memoranda/
pteguid.pdf. 
111  Regulatory Review and Reform (r3) Top 10 Rules, 2008 in Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2007:  Annual 
Report of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy on Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive 
Order 13272, at Appx. B (2008), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/07regflx.pdf; Regulatory Review and 
Reform (r3) Top 10 Rules, 2009, SBA Office of Advocacy, http://archive.sba.gov/advo/r3/r3_nominations09.html#10.  Although 
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Moreover, testimony at a recent joint hearing of the House Science Committee and 
Small Business Committee112 suggests that small businesses may in fact benefit from stricter 
regulation of some toxic substances, because the prohibition of some chemicals may open up new 
markets for those who manufacture “green” substitutes.  The Vice President of BioAmber, Ally 
Latourelle, stated in her testimony that “recognition that styrene is ‘reasonably anticipated’ to be 
carcinogenic is not detrimental to our small business.  In fact, for our business, as an alternative 
to petrochemicals, and the developers of non-toxic styrene replacement products, reports 
published by government on the toxicology of chemicals and regulations of those chemicals is 
a driver to our business as well as our strategic partners in the area of chemical production and 
manufacturing.”113  Apparently, the Office of Advocacy never inquired about these issues. 
Advocacy’s website indicated that it was accepting nominations until December 31, 2010 for its 2011 r3 initiative, the r3 Top Ten 
list has not been published in the RFA since 2009.
112  Hearing on Report on Carcinogens, supra note 82 (statement of Ally Latourelle, Vice President, Gov’t Affairs, BioAmber, 
Inc.).
113  Id. 
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5. Conclusions
The Regulatory Flexibility Act assigns to the Office of Advocacy responsibility for 
ensuring that federal agencies evaluate the impacts on small businesses of the rules they adopt.  
Cancer risk assessments are not covered by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.  They do not regulate 
small business.  The Office of Advocacy had no reasonable basis for becoming involved in the 
NTP or IRIS assessments. 
The Office of Advocacy’s decision to comment on technical, scientific assessments 
represents a significant and unwarranted expansion of its role and extends its reach well beyond 
the regulatory process.  By its own admission, Advocacy lacks the scientific expertise to evaluate 
the merits of the NTP/IRIS assessments.  Advocacy’s comments on these assessments raised 
no issues of specific concern to small business but relied almost exclusively on talking points 
provided by trade associations engaged in major lobbying campaigns. 
Between 2005 and 2012, the American Chemistry Council and its members spent more 
than $333 million lobbying Congress and federal agencies.114  The Formaldehyde Institute/
Council, Styrene Industry Research Council, and Chrome Coalition spent millions of dollars in a 
protracted lobbying campaign to prevent government agencies from designating these substances 
as carcinogenic and tens of millions more on research carefully designed to support their claims 
that these substances do not cause cancer in humans.  These groups asked the Office of Advocacy 
for assistance, and the Office became a willing partner in these lobbying efforts.
The Office of Advocacy’s efforts to block the NTP and IRIS assessments came amid 
efforts by the ACC to win congressional approval of legislation overhauling the NTP and IRIS 
assessment processes.   Both ACC and Dow Chemical lobbied Congress to delay publication 
of the Report on Carcinogens until the National Academy of Sciences conducted yet another 
review.115  Rep. Denny Rehberg (R-MT) unsuccessfully pushed an appropriations rider to do just 
that.116 
Besides the moral and ethical concerns raised by efforts to keep substances known 
to cause cancer on the market and in wide use, the activities of the Office of Advocacy are 
disturbing because they may be illegal.  Civil and criminal laws bar federal employees from 
lobbying.  While the Government Accountability Office admits that lobbying restrictions are 
“unclear and imprecise,” the Comptroller General has said anti-lobbying laws prohibit providing 
“administrative support for teh [sic] lobbying activities of private organizations.”117 
114  Jeremy P. Jacobs, Industry Group Boosted Political Spending Last Year – And it Paid Off, E&E Daily (Feb. 7, 2012), http://
www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/2012/02/07/1.
115  See Sass, supra note 47.
116  Committee on Appropriations, supra note 48.
117  U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/T-OGC-96-18, Testimony Before the Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives:  H.R. 3078, The Federal Agency Anti-Lobbying Act; Statement of 
Robert P. Murphy, General Counsel, General Accounting Office (1996), available at http://gao.justia.com/department-
of-the-interior/1996/5/h-r-3078-the-federal-agency-anti-lobbying-act-t-ogc-96-18/T-OGC-96-18-full-report.pdf; Lobbying and 
Publicity or Propaganda Guidelines: Appropriations Act Riders, Nat’l Institute Of Health Ethics Program, http://ethics.od.nih.gov/
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Our investigation raises serious questions about the lack of oversight of the Office of 
Advocacy’s actions.  The Office’s activities are not reviewed by the administrator of the Small 
Business Administration or the White House.  Congress has conducted no oversight hearings on 
the Office in more than 25 years, and GAO has not investigated the Office’s activities. 
Specific Findings and Recommendations
The Office of Advocacy submitted comments regarding three widely used chemicals, objecting 
to cancer assessments by the National Toxicology Program and the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Integrated Risk Information System, even though no federal regulation was at stake.  
These actions were not authorized by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and improperly expanded the 
Office of Advocacy’s jurisdiction into areas in which it has no expertise. 
	Recommendation:  The Office of Advocacy should limit its work to regulatory activities 
affecting small business, as authorized by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and subsequent laws.
The Office of Advocacy hosts regular Environmental Roundtables attended by trade association 
representatives and lobbyists.  The discussions and minutes are kept secret, although the 
consensus positions that emerge appear to inform the Office of Advocacy’s policy positions.  
These meetings violate the spirit, and perhaps the letter, of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.  
	Recommendation:  Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the Office of Advocacy’s 
Environmental Roundtables violate Federal Advisory Committee Act provisions.
The Office of Advocacy staff made no effort to educate themselves on the science underlying 
the debates about the cancer risks of these chemicals or to verify the accuracy of the talking 
points provided to them by industry lobbyists before filing comments critical of the NTP/IRIS 
processes and the scientific conclusions in each assessment.118  Instead, the Office of Advocacy 
simply repackaged and submitted talking points provided by trade association lobbyists as formal 
comments. 
	Recommendation:  The Office of Advocacy should independently verify the factual claims 
it makes in comments to other federal agencies and should not comment on technical or 
scientific matters on which its staff have no expertise.  
topics/Lobby-Publicity-Guide.htm#Footnote (last updated Feb. 18, 2011).  A 2009 investigation condemned the activities of a 
small unit inside the Department of Interior where communication between government staff and external parties “created the 
potential for conflicts of interest or violations of law.” Rep. Rob Bishop (R-Utah) who had called for the investigation responded: 
“The ongoing, explicit, far-reaching coordination between special interest lobbying groups and [government staff] . . . is troubling 
. . . . This inappropriate meddling of private and public lobbying efforts is precisely the sort of thing I warned against . . . .”  Bruce 
Hosking, Role of BLM Employees Questioned in Federal Investigation, Examiner.com (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/
article/role-of-blm-employees-questioned-federal-investigation. 
118  In each of these cases (formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium), other federal agencies like OSHA, NIOSH, ATSDR also 
extensively reviewed their cancer risks.  The Office of Advocacy made no effort to even compare the NTP or IRIS assessments to 
the work of other federal agencies.
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Correspondence between the Office of Advocacy and trade associations dominated by large 
chemical companies and their lobbyists suggests the Office became entangled in a major lobbying 
campaign to prevent the federal government from listing certain chemicals as known or probable 
carcinogens.  E-mails suggest the Office of Advocacy may have violated the Anti-Lobbying Act 
and other lobbying restrictions.  
	Recommendation:  Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the activities of the 
Office of Advocacy represent impermissible lobbying by federal employees. 
No small businesses objected to the scientific assessments or asked the Office of Advocacy 
to intervene in the cancer assessments.  The Office of Advocacy made no effort to determine 
whether the positions it took represented small business views and interests.  Moreover, since 
small businesses may produce substitutes for toxic chemicals, a cancer finding for existing 
chemicals could open up new markets for substitute chemicals produced by small businesses.  
	Recommendation: The Office of Advocacy should develop procedures to verify that its 
policies represent the interests of small business.  Its comments should be limited to offering a 
small business perspective that the regulating agency would not otherwise hear. 
No process or procedures seem to be in place to ensure that the activities of the Office of 
Advocacy are consistent with, and do not work to undermine, the statutory responsibilities of 
other agencies.  
	Recommendation:  Congress should exert more rigorous oversight over the Office of 
Advocacy to ensure its work does not delay or prevent other federal agencies from fulfilling 
their statutory goals, especially those scientific and regulatory agencies tasked with protecting 
the health of the American people.
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